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Historical Background to Conflicts
over Religion in Public Schools

by Charles L. Glenn

Conflict over how to accommodate religious
convictions in public schools has become a familiar theme in the United States. While American
public schools—at least the good ones, the ones
that are not wishy-washy—stand for a way of
understanding the goals of education and thus of
Dr. Paul Glenn, Fellow of The University Professors
and Professor of Education, Administration, Training,
and Policy Studies at Boston University, School of
Education, Boston, Massachusetts, has authored the
following works: The Myth of the Common School;
Educating Immigrant Children: Schools and
Language Minorities in Twelve Nations; Educational
Freedom in Eastern Europe; The Ambiguous
Embrace: Government and Faith-based Schools and
Social Agencies; and (with Jan De Groof) Finding the
Right Balance: Freedom and Accountability in
Education. Dr. Glenn has also authored book chapters
(more than 60 chapters in collections and published
articles) and published more than 120 articles and
reviews.

a good and flourishing human life, they are not
free to base that understanding on explicitly religious themes. This lack of freedom is by no
means self-evident. For Horace Mann, often considered “the Father of American public education,” it was beyond question that the school day
should include reading from the Bible—passages
carefully selected to reflect his optimistic and
moralistic Unitarianism, and intended to be universally acceptable. He and his allies were promoting the common public school, he wrote in
1846, in order “to elevate mankind into the upper
and purer regions of civilization, Christianity, and
the worship of the true God” (Glenn, Common
School 172-175). His religious critics, both
Protestant and Catholic, charged that he was
advocating an understanding of religion which
had little to do with its real power or with what
they believed.
The First Amendment to the Constitution has
been interpreted to forbid any level of government—including local public school systems—
from engaging in or directly supporting religious
practices. However, even if that interpretation
changed, it’s not at all clear that people for whom
religious beliefs are very important would want a
government agency deciding how those beliefs
would be interpreted and taught. Nor would we
want children whose beliefs differ from those of
the school forced to choose between violating
their consciences and being singled out by asking
to be excused. Nor would those for whom prayer
is important want to see it trivialized as a way to
quiet down a class, as has been suggested by
some advocates of “school prayer.”
In short, the American government is required,
for very good reasons, to be neutral between various religious beliefs, and also to be neutral
between belief and non-belief. Schools operated
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directly by government must act in ways consistent with that requirement, and so must each of
their teachers. They must not seek to promote
any particular religious belief, nor may they in
any way promote secularism (a way of understanding the world that explicitly rejects any idea
of divine purpose or meaning) in preference to
religion.
Schools operated by government, then, should
not behave like a church or other religious institution; they should not ask their students to
engage in religious practices. In a recent case, a
federal judge ruled that a New York State school
district had violated the rights of Christian families by having their children cut out images of a
Hindu god and build an altar and join in New Age
prayers for an Earth Day ritual. “While reading
the [Hindu god’s] story can be part of a neutral
secular curriculum,” the judge pointed out, he
could not find “any educational justification for
telling young impressionable students to construct images of a known religious god.”
Building the altar, he found, was “truly bizarre”
in a public school (Zielbauer, Paul. “Judge Rules
School District Erred on Religion in Classroom.”
New York Times 22 May 1999).
This particular event and response does not
mean that teachers should not mention religion,
should not present in accurate ways the role of
religious belief and religious institutions in
American history and society, and should avoid
mentioning religious motivations in discussions
of how we should make decisions about sexuality, social justice, and other issues. The Supreme
Court has noted that it would be an inadequate
education that did not give students an understanding of the role that religion has played in history and plays in our society. After all, as Justice
Clark wrote for the majority in an important case,
one’s education is not complete without a study of
comparative religion or the history of religion and
its relationship to the advancement of civilization.
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of
study for its literary and historic qualities.
Nothing we have said here indicates that such
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented
objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the
First Amendment. (Abington School District v.
Schempp 374 U.S. 203, 1963).
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One of the most liberal justices pointed out, in
the same case,
[t]he holding of the Court today plainly does not
foreclose teaching about the Holy Scriptures or
about the differences between religious sects in
classes in literature or history. Indeed, it would be
impossible to teach meaningfully many subjects
in the social sciences or the humanities without
some mention of religion. To what extent, and at
what points in the curriculum, religious materials
should be cited are matters which the courts ought
to entrust very largely to the experienced officials
who superintend our Nation’s public schools.
They are experts in such matters, and we are not.
[Justice Brennan, concurring]

Unfortunately, most public schools have been
guilty of what can only be called a cowardly
avoidance of this aspect of life. For example, one
study found that most textbooks never mentioned
that Martin Luther King, Jr., was a minister, or
that religion played a fundamental role in the
Freedom Movement of the 1960s. There was no
mention, in discussions of current American society, of evangelist Billy Graham, who has consistently been one of the most popular Americans
for the last thirty years, or of the fact that more
Americans attend religious services each week
than attend professional sports in a year!
It is entirely possible to teach about religion as
a social reality, and about the scriptures of different religious groups, without seeking to convert
anyone or to favor any particular faith. That kind
of teaching has been done in public schools, and
good curriculum and materials exist to support
teachers who seek to do so in an objective way.
But few do, nor is there room for teaching about
religion in the curriculum of most schools. Until
curriculum standards and textbooks change—
which is beginning to happen—we cannot expect
much better.
Many parents believe that the public schools
are hostile to religion. I think those parents are
wrong—“willfully neglectful” would be more
accurate—but I can understand their reaction.
And this reaction has contributed to undermining
support for the public schools, and to surrounding
them with conflict. Many leading educators, in
turn, do not hesitate to describe Christian organizations as “the enemy.” I think that such educators are wrong, too, but again I can understand

why they find it so difficult to hear what their critics are saying.
In some other Western democracies, like the
United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany, religious
instruction is provided as part of the regular public-school program, with students or their parents
allowed some choice among Protestant, Catholic,
and other alternatives. In English schools, each
school day is supposed to include a daily act of
worship of a predominantly Christian character,
even in schools where most of the children are
Muslim or Hindu.
Germans were divided, a few years ago, over
whether schools in Bavaria should be required—
when parents objected—to remove the crucifixes,
which have traditionally hung in each classroom;
the outcome required a ruling by the national
Constitutional Court. More recently, the same
court has considered whether Muslim teachers in
public schools have a right to wear the hijab or
scarf covering their hair, and this issue will have
to be addressed by legislators. While the issue
seems to have been resolved in Germany, litigation over a crucifix in a public-school classroom
stirred passions in Italy as the 2003-2004 school
year started. Devout Catholics were not necessarily those most opposed to the removal of crucifixes at the demand of a parent who had converted to
Islam; for some, the removal of crucifixes was a
convenient symbol of unwelcome societal
changes resulting from immigration and from a
rapidly-evolving culture.
Whether to include the theory of evolution in
state-mandated examinations caused a political
crisis in the Netherlands in mid-1995: a group of
conservative Protestant Reformatorische schools
objected, and a characteristically Dutch compromise was reached. Compromise is rarely the outcome of such controversies in the United States.
Americans go to court (as in the current Pledge of
Allegiance case) and winner takes all.
In France, the determination of hundreds of
Muslim girls to wear the hijab or scarf covering
their hair in school has divided opinions on the
Left and Right alike, and seems no closer to resolution after fourteen years of controversy.
Schools in the U.S., according to the Department
of Education’s clarification in 1998, “may not
single out religious attire in general, or attire of a
particular religion, for prohibition or regulation.”

Responding to the French proposal of a law to
forbid the wearing of religious symbols in
schools, the Bush administration’s top official on
issues of religious freedom stated that “a fundamental principle of religious freedom that we
work for in many countries of the world, including on this very issue of head scarves, is that all
persons would be able to practice their religion
and their beliefs peacefully, without government
interference, as long as they are doing so without
provocation and intimidation of others in society.”
Considered comparatively, several questions
suggest themselves to an American observer.
Why, for example, is religion such a presence in
public schools in Germany and England, while it
is banned completely from public schools in the
United States, a country where religious practice
has remained much stronger? Why, given the
strict secularity of public schools in the United
States, are Muslim girls allowed to wear the hijab
while in France, with a similar “republican” tradition of schooling, is it a continuing source of controversy? Why have most Western democracies
organized their systems of public education on a
pluralistic basis—the Netherlands, Belgium,
Northern Ireland, Australia, much of Canada—
while in others, such as the United States and
Italy, a system of government monopoly of the
provision of public education is only beginning to
change?
To begin to answer these and other questions,
we must look to the period in the nineteenth century when universal popular education developed
in several countries, and also to the more recent
period when each was forced to come to terms
with a growing diversity of and conflict over
ways of understanding the world and the goals of
education.
France
If the Dutch have leaned over backwards to
protect the rights of schools of distinctive character corresponding to the views of minority
groups, in France the prevailing assumption is
that social unity depends upon a common experience of schooling. The desire of some Muslim
girls (voluntary in some cases, coerced in others,
it seems) to cover their hair in class with a scarf
or hijab has been widely interpreted as an imper-
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missible intrusion of religion and ethnicity into
schools. The Jacobin model of aggressively secular public education seeks to confine real human
differences—including religious convictions—to
the private sphere. This typically French “secular
fundamentalism” fails to take into account the
communities and beliefs by which people (not
just Muslim immigrants) structure their lives.
“Secularism has demonstrated its intolerance,”
said a young Muslim high school teacher in the
wake of expulsions of hijab-wearing girls from a
school in Lille; the time had come to demand
public funding for separate Muslim schools, as in
the Netherlands. The Ministry of Education has
in fact already received applications from such
schools, and it seems only a matter of time before
some receive contracts and public funding.
The French government policy of directing
schools to exclude girls who insist upon covering
their hair with an hijab seems likely, some
observers contend, to have an opposite effect than
intended: rather than promoting the integration
and acculturation of immigrant pupils, it marginalizes them further by accentuating how they are
different. The hijab has become the preeminent
symbol of Muslim rejection of the values of
French society—and of modernity in general—
precisely because it has been banned from
schools. The president of the Conference of
Catholic Bishops has predicted that the proposed
complete ban will have the effect of increasing
separatism (Le Point 14 November 2003).
Obsessive anticlericalism was a major theme of
French political life throughout the nineteenth
century and much of the twentieth, often bringing
together activists who could agree on no other
issue than their opposition to the influence of the
Catholic Church. Popular schooling was the
sphere where this concern was expressed most
strongly, and the strong growth of Catholic teaching congregations around 1850 caused grave concern in these circles. Anticlericals assumed that
the education received in Catholic schools would
make their pupils unfit to be citizens. In a celebrated formulation in 1822, General Foy lamented that “they will have received in these establishments, which are not national, an instruction
which is not national, and thus these establishments will have the effect of dividing France into
two youths (deux jeunesses)” (qtd. in Rémond
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114). A generation later, influential Catholic layman Charles Montalembert described “two
armies face to face, each of about thirty to forty
thousand men: the army of teachers and the army
of priests . . . . The demoralizing and anarchical
army of teachers must be countered by the army
of priests” (Ponteil 230-31, 235).
It is, in fact, during this period that the term
laïque (secular) began to be applied to a program
of opposition to clerical influence on social institutions. “Anticlericalism,” Rémond points out,
“is not religious indifference, quite the contrary”;
it is more a counter-religion than a non-religion.
The term itself began to be used around 1852
(Rémond 46, 0). Thus, Arsène Meunier published a book entitled “struggle of the clerical
principle and the secular principle in education”
(1861), insisting that “the State is secular, and in
consequence the instruction given in its name
must be secular, and if this word doesn’t seem
clear, we will say that it signifies for us that public education, without being irreligious, must forget all positive religion” (qtd. in Barbier, 7n).
The word laïcité (secularity) has been traced to
1871, in connection with a debate about schools.
Not that this laïc position was neutral with
respect to the worldview to be promoted in public schools. The Republicans who shaped French
institutions in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century “had all borrowed from [Auguste] Comte
the idea that a spiritual power was necessary to
establish a republic . . . and all ended by joining
the Freemasons . . . and all wanted to make the
School and the University this new Church”
(Nicolet 156-57): “For Comte as for all his disciples, instruction and education—for the two are
inseparable—were at the very base of the regeneration of humanity.” Their educational program
forbade “all illusory questioning about prime
causes or final ends, which absolutely excluded
all transcendence” (Nicolet 28).
The first decades of the Third Republic were
the high point of Masonic influence on public life
and on education (as it was in contemporary
Italy), and of Catholic opposition to this influence; Pope Leo XIII condemned the Masons, in
1884, as the “party of Satan.” While French
Masons had been vaguely deist earlier in the century, in 1876 the Grand Orient suppressed in their
constitution all references to God or the existence

of the soul (Rebérioux 43). It was not without
significance that “throughout the Third Republic
the Ministry of Public Instruction was traditionally occupied by Masons,” and in 1899, 150 members of the Chambre de Députés were Masons
(Ozouf and Ozouf 219; Visse 149). It is no exaggeration to say that “Masonry constituted the
cadres and the school of the Republican party” in
the Third Republic (Chevallier 550).
This masonic involvement led inescapably to
conflict with the Catholic Church: “One does not
understand the . . . republicans of the 19th century
if one does not realize that the anti-clerical struggle seemed to their eyes, as the result of a century of unhappy experiences, as the inevitable precondition, although never definitively achieved,
of all future progress: literally, as the motor of
history.” It was a matter of achieving the moral
unity of the nation, more important even than its
territorial or legal unity. All intermediate associations between the nation and the individual—
apart from tightly controlled local administration—were seen as an unacceptable threat to this
unity. Even more challenging to the authority of
the Republic was any form of transcendence that
suggested a higher source of authority (Nicolet
273, 447, 484).
A law passed in March 1882 made elementary
schooling obligatory and secular, specifically
excluding from the curriculum the teaching of
“obligations toward God.” The government
sometimes showed a degree of flexibility in communities where parents were strongly insistent
upon maintaining elements of the religious character of local schools. A ministerial circular gave
departmental officials “complete latitude to make
allowances in this respect for the wishes of the
population,” and some public schools continued
to display the crucifix on classroom walls as late
as 1906 (Curtis 142). Nevertheless, “far from
establishing unity, the insistence on lay education
and the elimination of God from the civic [education] manuals, divided the country profoundly,
and exacerbated the clash of Church and republic” (Zeldin 262).
In 1909, some secular activists began to advocate a state monopoly of schooling (Mona Ozouf
231). Opponents of religion were found not only
in the masonic lodges but also in more than a
thousand organizations of “freethinkers,” “pursu-

ing ardently the completion of the work of the
French Revolution and intervening in all sectors
of the life of the country to secularize the State
and the society, to ‘ensure the complete laïcité of
the French spirit.” Educational freedom, they
insisted, was merely a sophism as long as there
was a church seeking to distort the souls of children: “There can be no freedom in the presence
of clericalism” (Lalouette 292).
In fact, in the political struggles over education
that troubled France for several decades—indeed,
that have never really ceased—both sides
invoked “freedom” as their guiding principle: “It
was a conflict of two freedoms. Two divergent
conceptions of liberty were in confrontation: one
defended the right of [members of religious
orders] to teach freely; the other sought to liberate the country from the grip of [teaching] congregations which surreptitiously educated youth
in the ‘hatred’ of the Republic” (Baubérot 47).
Paradoxically, as Charles Renouvier and other
moderate anticlericals had warned (Blais 323),
measures to drive religion out of the public
schools actually had the effect of strengthening
alternative Catholic education. Abolition of public funding for the salaries of bishops and priests,
which had prevented effective resistance to the
measures secularizing public schools in the
1880s, freed them to make Catholic schools a priority. In areas of strong religious practice, many
new schools were established (Déloye 233).
Supporters of subsidies for private schools
were able, under the Fifth Republic, to achieve
passage of the Loi Debré, adopted December 31,
1959. As Prime Minister Michel Debré said in
parliamentary debates, the private sector, with
1,797,000 pupils, “brings to the education of
French youth a cooperation which it would be
unjust to fail to recognize” (Visse 62). This law,
still in effect, asserts that “the State proclaims and
respects educational freedom,” and establishes a
system under which non-state schools enter into
contracts with the State for the provision of educational services, while maintaining some measure of autonomy (see discussion in Glenn and De
Groof Vol. I, 252-66).
In 1996-97, there were almost 25,000 pupils
attending unsubsidized private secondary
schools, in contrast with the more than 1.1 million in subsidized secondary schools under con-

Pro Rege—September 2004 5

tract with the state (Durand-Prinborgne 67).
Almost all non-public schools are Catholic: 96
percent of the pupils in non-public elementary
schools and 86.4 percent of those in non-public
secondary schools in 1990-91; altogether,
Catholic schools serve nearly two million pupils.
The real distinctiveness of these Catholic schools
is sometimes called into question, since those that
receive public funding are required to conform
themselves in many respects to the ever-changing
model of public schools. In a highly secularized
society, it is to be expected that the religious distinctiveness of Catholic schools is sometimes difficult to detect.
How does the French treatment of the religious
dimension (whether explicit or implicit) of education compare with that in the United States? It
has been suggested that the pattern of accommodation of religion in American society consists of
a triangular pattern of religious freedom, disestablishment of churches, and pluralism, while the
corresponding French triangle is religious freedom, an implicit state church, and civil unity
(Baubérot 290). In effect, according to this analysis, France never went through a “disestablishment”; there was instead a replacement of the
Catholic Church by the secular “Church of the
Republic,” with its well-articulated worldview, a
mixture of Comtean positivism, Kantian ethics,
and intense nationalism in reaction to the humiliation of 1870:
The new God of Comte, the religion without dogmas of Buisson, Freemasonry or the Socialism of
Jaurès are all responses to this need and this challenge. But the France of the Ancien Régime had
known for too long and too deeply the penetration
of the Church and the State for the Republic to be
able to accommodate itself to the simple equality
of religions or the simple freedom of conscience.
Every religion, divine or secular, takes among us
a dogmatic form and seeks naturally to organize
itself as a Church and to penetrate the State.
(Nicolet 499)

As a result of this switch of establishments
rather than disestablishment, and (as Quinet and
others argued in the 1850s) of the defeat of the
Reformation in France in the sixteenth century,
religious pluralism has never flourished in
France, as has been evident in the current difficulties about how to come to terms with Islam, for
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which the symbolical focal point has been the
wearing, by schoolgirls, of the scarf or hijab in
class (see Gaspard and Khosrokhavar; Glenn,
“Limits of Tolerance”).
Germany
Governments of the various states that came
together in 1870 to form modern Germany had
used the state-supported Protestant and Catholic
churches to provide oversight over local schools
that were not, however, church-run. It was made
very clear that the role of local clergy was as
agents of the government, and government did
not hesitate to remove them from supervising or
providing religious instruction in schools when
there was any reason to doubt their full loyalty to
the regime, as occurred in Prussia’s Polish
provinces and in Alsace-Lorraine during the
Kulturkampf.
Despite these occasional tensions, however,
almost all elementary schools retained a confessional character: they were Protestant or Catholic
or (in a few cases) Jewish public schools, despite
frequent demands from advanced elements of the
teaching profession that the schools be made religiously-neutral or “interconfessional” with separate religious instruction. For those concerned
about the role of religion in education, the interconfessional school threatened to marginalize it
into “merely one subject in the curriculum
[which] would no longer penetrate and inspire the
entire instruction.” “The fight for the interconfessional school, which raged a generation ago,”
Minister of Education Studt wrote in 1903, “no
longer stands in the foreground of the activities
and interests” of the parties at the dominant center of the political spectrum. “People have recognized that the interconfessional school carries
with it disadvantages insofar as it is apt to impair
not only religious and moral education but also
the cultivation of patriotism” (qtd. in Lamberti
213).
Hopes that interconfessional schools would
have a unifying influence on a religiously divided
society were disappointed; in cities where they
were imposed by a liberal elite, “the results were
political strife rather than social integration and
mutual respect between the religious groups”
(Lamberti 214). In another sense, of course, they
did promote Catholic and Protestant cooperation

in opposition to secular liberalism.
The effect of accommodation of religion within the Volksschule was to maintain state monopoly of popular schooling, since accommodation
made it unnecessary for Catholics and orthodox
Protestants to create their own schools, as
occurred in the Netherlands: “Teaching religion
as a required subject in the public schools guaranteed that the instruction remained under the
state’s oversight and served the state’s interests”
(Lamberti 217).
Although opposed to denominational schooling, German liberals were not calling for the
exclusion of the teaching of religion in the
schools, since including it “guaranteed that the
instruction would be given in the state’s interests
and under the state’s supervision,” and the alternative seemed to be the danger that a system of
parochial schools would be created. Liberals
warned that if the State “permits private schools
freely in order to satisfy special confessional
interests, then it is only serving the ambitions of
the clergy to dominate [education], as the example of Belgium proves” (Lamberti 63). Similarly,
government officials were concerned that
removal of religion from the Volksschule would
lead to establishment of private church schools
not under direct state control; they “doubted that
religiously neutral communal schools would
compete successfully with Catholic private
schools and thought that a large part of popular
education would soon be removed from the control of the state. The surest way to preserve the
state’s monopoly of education was to have the
public schools serve the purposes of the church as
well as the state” (Lamberti 216).
In a continuation of the strategy adopted in the
mid-nineteenth century, government continues to
offer denominational religious instruction in public schools as a way of reducing the demand for
private confessional schools. Such instruction
enjoys a constitutional guarantee, and “must
remain as a free-standing subject in the public
school” (Avenarius and Heckel 69). Public
schools must therefore provide space, materials,
and teachers, as well as any additional costs for
religious instruction, and the grades that pupils
receive in this subject can count in the same way
as grades in other subjects, even for promotion
(Thiel 106). In addition to such external guaran-

tees, it must be said, there have been notable
efforts to make religious instruction “more correct, believable, methodologically modern, and
humanly helpful” (Reble 202, 377).
Schools in Germany today are not ideologically neutral; they have a responsibility to develop in
their pupils those dispositions considered necessary to maintain society and the political order.
How to define these, and how to implement
value-laden programs without conflicting with
individual freedoms, is an on-going problem, as
in other countries.
In Bavaria, the Land with the most conservative and Catholic influence, an initial effort was
made with American support to implement interdenominational Simultanschulen in place of
restoring confessional schools, but the attempt
encountered such determined opposition that it
was abandoned, and the Bavarian Constitution
guaranteed a right to confessional education; in
1988 the Bavarian Constitutional Court concluded that the specification of the 1946 state
Constitution, that “reverence for God” was
among the highest objectives of Bavarian
schools, was consistent with other provisions protecting individual rights (Tent 112, 127, 139;
Spotts 86; Waterkamp 262). However, this reverence must not be understood in the sense of
establishing a state religion with a particular way
of understanding the divine (Thiel 125-31).
Displaying crucifixes in classrooms was simply
a manifestation of this accommodation of religion
within, rather than alongside, German public
schools. Symbolic expressions of the Christian
faith are ubiquitous in Western nations, nor would
one have to look far, in most European cities, to
find signs of an Islamic presence as well. No one
is sheltered from such sights, any more than from
the images of violence and sexuality which children pass on their way to school. The German
Constitutional Court decided, however, that public elementary schools represented a different situation: “Together with compulsory attendance,
crosses in classrooms have the effect that during
instruction pupils are confronted with this symbol, on behalf of the state and without the possibility of avoidance, and are forced to learn under
the cross.”
The court’s majority rejected the contention of
three of its members that the cross was merely a
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reminder of the influence of Christianity upon
Western culture. “Plainly a symbol of belief,”
while it doesn’t compel the children to identify
with Christianity, the cross “sets out the contents
of the faith symbolized by it as exemplary and
worthy of adherence.” Some observers noted that
Christians would have had more reason to protest
if the court had accepted the argument that a crucifix was no more than “a sentimental wall decoration”!
This ruling did not ban crucifixes from classrooms, but it stated that the state could not require
them without regard to the objections of parents.
Many of those reacting to the decision, Socialists
as well as Christian Democrats, drew the lesson
that it should be left up to each school—not to the
state—to determine what religious symbols to
display; several Catholic and Protestant church
leaders suggested that Muslim, Jewish and other
symbols would be appropriate alongside the
cross, depending upon the pupils in the school,
and “would contribute more to mutual understanding and tolerance than would a naked wall.”
The Netherlands
The Dutch have avoided the tyranny of the
majority in education by providing public funding for a wide diversity of schools. Any group
that can meet state standards and convince
enough parents to enroll their children is able to
operate a tuition-free school; in fact, only 30 percent of pupils attend government-operated
schools. This approach has encouraged responsible experimentation and minimized conflict over
education. In August of 1995, however, there was
a brief but intense flare-up over the right to differ
from the prevailing orthodoxy about evolution.
The government had decided several years
before that nationwide examinations in biology
would not include Darwin’s theory; schools
would be required to teach about it and assess student knowledge by their own tests. This decision
was based upon advice from the board responsible for interpreting constitutional guarantees of
educational freedom. Evolution, it concluded,
was a sensitive matter (comparable to abortion
and euthanasia) that each school should be
allowed to handle in its own way, to protect its
distinctive identity.
Members of the Left-of-Center coalition then
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in power sought to require that the theory of evolution be required on nationwide examinations.
Those opposed argued that the question was
whether there was a divine purpose for human
life or not, and that public policy should respect
the convictions of that part of the population who
chose schools where this purpose was considered
central. Supporters of educational freedom rallied, and the effort to include evolution on national examinations failed. Once again, the pluralistic approach to national life advocated by
Abraham Kuyper was vindicated.
A true system of primary schooling emerged in
the Netherlands in the first years of the nineteenth
century, given a unity of direction unique for its
time by a nationwide corps of school inspectors,
most of them Protestant ministers, who examined
prospective teachers and visited local schools on
a regular basis, while receiving guidance and
encouragement from the Agent for National
Education based in The Hague.
The liberal leadership of the predominant
Protestant Church (which, even after it was officially “disestablished” in 1796 continued to play
a semi-official role in Dutch life) supported these
reforms as contributing to the promotion among
the common people of their own religious views.
Initially, Catholic leadership supported these educational reforms as an improvement upon the previously preponderant influence of the Protestant
church establishment on schools. Thus, the
Netherlands—during the first decades of building
a system of schooling—avoided the conflict
between school policies and the wishes of parents
that did so much damage in France at the same
period. By the time such conflict broke out, the
system was well established.
The public schools were required to teach a
“general Christianity” that would develop in their
pupils “all social and Christian virtues,” as the
1806 law put it. The lawmakers had been “thoroughly convinced of the importance of public
education for all classes of society and especially
for the upcoming generation, whose happiness
hangs above all on the early implanting of the
fundamental principles of religion and ethics”
(qtd. in Bruin 65). The government decided, in
1817, to fund some private Jewish schools but—
in this period—no private Catholic or Protestant
schools. Public schools were intended to be

national, bringing together all children whatever
their social background, their (Christian) denomination, or their sex.
Many Protestants who continued to hold to the
orthodox Calvinism that had flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries objected to the
liberal, non-doctrinal version of Christianity promoted by the public schools. Although there
were daily prayers and Bible reading in the
schools, the instruction—especially that concerned with morality—rested upon an anthropology that denied the power of sin and the need for
a Redeemer, an approach considered by the orthodox as a denial of essentials of the Christian faith.
In protest, some parents kept their children home
or sent them to illegal schools; fathers were in
some cases sent to jail. In 1834, for example,
local authorities in one community ordered the
police to issue a warrant against orthodox
Protestants who had begun to educate their children in a barn to avoid the objectionable teaching
of the public school. The school inspector offered
an official opinion that “the founding of a new
school is a disruptive movement against the
standing order of things” (qtd. in Bos 10), no light
charge in that period of social unrest.
There was also resistance from Catholics. This
Catholic dissatisfaction took the most dangerous
turn in the southern provinces that had formerly
been an Austrian possession and had been awarded to the new Kingdom of the Netherlands under
the peace concluding the Napoleonic wars.
Although the government moved cautiously at
first to avoid alarming the heavily Catholic population of Flanders, Brabant, and the other southern provinces, the commission sent to investigate
the quality of schooling there concluded that it
was out-of-date and ineffective. The measures
prescribed by the 1806 law went gradually into
effect in the southern provinces, with the establishment of a teacher-training institution and a
steady pressure to adopt whole-class instruction
and other classroom reforms. School inspectors—the government took care to appoint
Catholics—pressed for continual improvements
and for teaching on a non-denominational
Christian basis (Dodde and Lenders 165ff).
These efforts to impose the model of “general
Christianity” on elementary schools and to bring
the training of priests within the public system of

secondary and higher education aroused growing
resistance (Boekholt 140). The government “recognized the principle of educational freedom, but
joined to it such control that there was a risk of a
state monopoly.” The Catholic leadership, in
turn, objected to the oversight of schooling by a
Protestant king, however lightly that oversight
was exercised, and education became one of the
issues leading to the successful rebellion of what
became Belgium (Wynants 20). The use of
schooling as an instrument of nation-building, in
this instance, led ironically to the break-up of the
nation,
[when] the creation of new generations of young
citizens . . . took on the character of patriotic
self-affirmation. That was why, when the statesmen at Vienna yoked together northern and southern Netherlands who, for twenty years, had undergone entirely different cultural and administrative
experience, the one area where the Dutch had had
undisputed success—education—would cause the
most bitter contention of the new Kingdom.
(Schama 541)

After the loss of the Belgian provinces as a
result of such conflicts, the government became
more sensitive to the grievances of Catholics in
what remained of the Netherlands. In 1822, the
Catholic journalist Le Sage ten Broek, a convert
from Protestantism, had called on Catholic pastors to start parochial schools, and there were
growing complaints that the public schools were
too Protestant. Singing religious songs, reading
from the Bible, and the lack of crucifixes on
school walls were all considered dangerous for
the spiritual well-being of Catholic pupils. The
efforts of the government, some Catholics
charged, were spreading religious indifference
through the schools (Bruin 210ff).
Concerned about these growing tensions, especially in view of the Belgian revolt, the government issued a decree in 1842 that responded to
many of the concerns of Catholics, though at the
price of further alienating orthodox Protestants
from the public schools. In filling teacher vacancies, local officials should take into account the
religious identity of the local population. All
public (and private) schools were required to
report on what “books, songs, and writing” they
were using so that it could be determined by religious authorities whether any were offensive to
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them; if necessary, offensive passages could be
removed. School facilities were to be made available for an hour each day for doctrinal instruction
given by the local church, whether Protestant or
Catholic (Bruin 241f). The Calvinist Heidelberg
Catechism vanished from the public schools in
Catholic areas, and books approved by the
Catholic hierarchy were introduced. What was to
be understood as “general Christian education”
was gradually less and less clear, and teachers
didn’t know how they should approach it
(Boekholt 144).
While these measures were greeted with some
satisfaction by Catholics, they did not prove a
lasting solution for those who wanted explicitly
Catholic schooling. While “for the Protestant
part of the people the break with the past was too
radical, from the Catholic point of view it was not
radical enough, since the school retained a
Protestant character, was not neutral, and certainly not Catholic” (Boekholt 134).
Protestant intellectual Groen van Prinsterer
charged that the public schools were being robbed
of their Protestant character, and concluded that
the only solution was to allow separate Protestant
and Catholic public schools. This proposal was
fiercely resisted by those who believed that the
common public school was the institution that
should knit the nation together.
Over the next decades—some would say for
seventy years—one of the dominant issues in
Dutch political life was the so-called “school
struggle” (schoolstrijd) over, first, the freedom to
establish and operate non-state schools with a
confessional basis and, second, the right to public
funding for these schools. The freedom was
already implicit in the 1806 legislation, but the
conflicts that had led to the separation of Belgium
made it clear that this freedom should be
anchored more firmly in fundamental law. The
new constitution adopted in 1848, partly in
response to the political upheavals in France and
elsewhere (Bruin 246), reflected the Liberal
desire to reduce the supervision of the state over
society, including schooling:
Public education is a matter of continuing concern
for the government. The arrangements [inrichting] of public education, with respect for everyone’s religious convictions, shall be regulated by
law. In all parts of the kingdom public authorities
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shall provide public elementary education.
Providing education is free [that is, anyone may
provide education], under the oversight of the
authorities and, in addition, with respect to secondary and elementary education, subject to
investigation of the qualifications and the moral
character of the teachers, both of which are to be
regulated by law. (Article 194)

It was not until 1857, however, that a new education law was passed to replace that of 1806; significantly, the prime mover was an orthodox
Protestant who had earlier founded the first private school with a distinctively Protestant character. Public schools should seek to develop in their
pupils “all Christian and social virtues” (a reversal of the order of terms from the 1806 law). The
1857 law gave more responsibility to local
authorities, who appointed local school committees to oversee the schools. While there were still
government inspectors, these came to have a less
direct contact with schools (Boekholt 151). An
effort to include subsidies for private schools was
eliminated during floor debate, and in general the
new law was disappointing to supporters of confessional education.
The cost of schools continued to be borne
almost entirely by local authorities and by parents
until 1878. A new generation of Liberals, more
committed to government intervention and less to
parental freedom and explicitly hostile to confessional schools (Langedijk 140), enacted education legislation providing that the state would pay
thirty percent of the cost of schools and, under
some circumstances, even more. Other provisions of this law increased significantly the costs
of schools. The legislation was opposed by supporters of confessional education since it would
make their schools much more expensive to operate. Confessional schools would remain free,
Protestant leader Abraham Kuyper noted, “yes,
free to hurry on crutches after the neutral [school]
train that storms along the rails of the law, drawn
by the golden locomotive of the State” (Gilhuis
152).
The Liberals had overreached. This threat
against the schools that many of the orthodox
common people had labored to establish aroused
them and created a movement that, in a decade,
reversed the political fortunes of the Liberals and
brought state support for confessional schools. A

massive petition drive collected, in five days,
305,102 signatures from Protestants and 164,000
from Catholics asking the king to refuse to sign
the new legislation. When that failed, a national
organization, “The Union ‘A School With the
Bible,’” created a permanent mechanism for the
mobilization of orthodox Protestants, which soon
led to the establishment of the first real political
party in the Netherlands, significantly called the
Anti-Revolutionary Party.
Catholics were equally active, and together
with the orthodox Protestants, they gained a
majority in Parliament by 1888. As an historian
of Dutch liberalism has pointed out, the effort to
smother the last flickering flame of orthodox religion only succeeded in fanning it into vigorous
life (Riel 108, 111).
The School Law of 1889 provided the same 30
percent state subsidy to confessional schools as to
local government schools and began a process
that would lead, in 1920, to the full financial
equality of all schools meeting the quality
requirements set by the state. The 1889 law also
forbade local authorities from making their
schools free, a strategy that many had employed
to compete with private confessional schools
(Boekholt 219). The intention was to create a
more level playing-field, though it would require
another thirty years of political struggle to establish the present Dutch system, under which there
is no financial incentive to send one’s children to
a secular public school rather than to a religious
school and under which about 70 percent of all
pupils attend non-public schools, most of them
Catholic or Protestant.
The “politics of accommodation” (Lijphart’s
phrase) allowed—and continues to allow—policy
issues involving religious institutions and the religious convictions of what is now a minority of the
population to be resolved without the bitter conflict that resonates in France.
England
The development of popular schooling in
England (in contrast with Scotland) was almost
entirely the result of private initiatives. In 1833,
in the immediate wake of the widening of the
electoral franchise through the Reform Act of
1832, Lord Brougham called for “the improvement of the moral condition of the people by

affording them the means of popular education,”
through support for the voluntary bodies set up by
members of the Church of England, on the one
hand, and by “Dissenters,” on the other (Simon
164). Such measures were opposed by the Irish
leader in Parliament, Daniel O’Connell, who
argued that “nothing could be more destructive
than to imitate the example of France in respect to
her system of national education” (qtd. in Green
263). While the initial measures were defeated,
the issue did lead to a compromise under which a
grant of £20,000 was distributed equally to the
two English denominational societies (and another £10,000 to the Church of Scotland the following year) for construction of schools. The terms
of the act are significant: the funds were “to be
issued in aid of private subscriptions for the erection of school houses for the education of the
poorer classes of Great Britain” (qtd. in Reisner
249).
After decades of heroic efforts by denominational groups, with partial public subsidies, to
extend popular schooling—especially in the rapidly-growing cities—Parliament passed the 1870
Education Act, which served as the charter of a
system of publicly-controlled schooling. The
purpose of this bill was not to replace the denominational schools or private initiatives, but to
ensure that all children had access to adequate
schools:
Our object is to complete the present voluntary
system, to fill up gaps, sparing the public money
where it can be done without, procuring as much
as we can the assistance of the parents, and welcoming as much as we rightly can the co-operation and aid of those benevolent men who desire
to assist their neighbours. (qtd. in Maclure 100)

The 1870 Act was built upon three essential
compromises among denominational and other
groups: a conscience clause to excuse pupils from
religious instruction, non-denominational inspection of schools, and “compliance with conditions
securing secular efficiency.” The Act had widespread effects:
[It] upset the Anglicans for establishing School
Boards, authorized to set up non-sectarian schools
supported from local taxation.
It upset
Nonconformists and Secularists by stating that
these Board Schools would supplement, rather
than replace, the denominational schools, and that
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denominational schools would continue to receive
state grants. It upset Secularists and some
Nonconformists by permitting the new schools to
provide religious teaching, provided they did not
teach the formularies of any specific denomination. At the same time it defused criticism slightly by introducing a ‘Conscience Clause’ permitting parents to withdraw their children from religious instruction. (McLeod 72)

Everyone was upset, but everyone could live with
the results. A period of six months was granted to
the churches to propose additional schools, before
local boards would be formed to address the
unmet needs. The Church of England immediately unveiled plans for an additional 2,900 schools,
while other denominations proposed an additional 400.
Unlike France in the same period, England did
not consider it necessary that schools become
secular as well as free and compulsory. Religion
remained—as it is to this day in England—a regular part of the curriculum in most public schools,
though the 1870 Act required that it be undenominational. Protestant Dissenters as well as
free-thinkers had long argued that “in national
education all differences of opinion in religion
and politics should be laid aside; we should
endeavour to fortify the mind against prejudices
and error by inculcating principles of universal
truth” (Quarterly Journal of Education [1835],
qtd. in Dyson & Lovelock 92).
A few school boards, notably that of the Liberal
stronghold Birmingham, decided that the instruction in their schools would be strictly without
religious elements, but this decision was overturned in 1879 and thereafter the schools included Bible reading—without commentary—in the
daily program. Manchester, by contrast, provided fifty minutes a day of Christian religious
instruction in its public schools (McLeod, 72).
Before World War II, public schools often used
the “agreed syllabus” developed by an ecumenical group of Protestants in 1924 (Timmins 81).
The role of the church-sponsored schools was
further strengthened by the 1902 Education Act,
which entitled them to local tax support as well as
the central government grants that they were
already receiving. In urging its enactment, Prime
Minister Balfour pointed out that it would redress
“the deplorable starvation of voluntary schools,”
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which after all were serving the majority of
schoolchildren. “As we have . . . left to the parents the responsibility for choosing what religion
their children are to learn, surely we ought . . . to
make our system as elastic as we can in order to
meet their wishes” (qtd. in Maclure 151ff). The
Act created some 300 local education authorities
(LEAs), superseding local school boards in the
control of what would henceforth be called “provided” schools and exercising substantial authority, as well, over the secular education provided in
publicly-subsidized “non-provided” denominational schools. The LEAs assumed much of the
funding and oversight responsibility previously
exercised by national authorities (Phillips
117-172), in exchange for a third of the seats on
the governing boards of these voluntary schools.
Local taxes were to be provided on an equal basis
to the two categories of schools, supplemented in
both cases by national grants.
Arrangements for denominational schooling
were codified in the Education Act 1944, under
which
the financial settlement was made more generous
to the voluntary bodies. Church schools could
choose “Aided” or “Controlled” status. “Aided”
schools were to receive grants to cover teachers’
salaries and other maintenance charges; a grant of
50 percent toward the cost of alteration of buildings; the cost of all internal repairs and half the
cost of external repairs. Other grants at 50 per
cent (increased to 75 per cent in 1959) were
payable in respect of new school building when a
school was transferred to a new site because the
existing premises could not be brought up to standard, or where a new school was to be built in substitution for one or more existing schools. . . . In
Aided schools, the appointment of staff remained
in the control of the Governors or Managers, the
majority of whom were to be nominated by the
Voluntary [denominational] body.
As for
Controlled schools, their governing bodies were
to include a majority of L.E.A. representatives but
denominational instruction was permitted to continue. Their schools became the financial responsibility of the L.E.A. (Maclure 222)

As R. A. Butler, its primary creator, intended,
the 1944 Act “settled, apparently once and for all,
the religious question” (Timmins 92). While
Roman Catholic schools (9.8 percent of all

government-supported schools) chose the more
independent “aided” status, the majority of the
Church of England schools that make up 21.3
percent of government-supported schools are
“controlled” (12.5 percent vs. 8.8 percent
“aided”). Much depends, for “voluntary controlled” schools, upon whether the representatives of the local education authority are willing
to support the denominational character of the
school in curriculum and other decisions
(Chadwick 62).
The United States
The 1830s in the United States, as in Western
Europe, was a decade of intense interest in popular schooling. Dispersal of the native population
beyond the reach of the civilizing institutions of
the East was one of the pressing concerns of this
reform movement; another was the growing number of immigrants. A group of educators in Ohio
expressed, in 1836, their concern with the “vast
tide of immigration, yearly flowing in upon us,
from all nations.” The only answer was “to take
their children . . . and educate them in the same
schools with our own, and thus amalgamate them
with our community” (qtd. in Cohen II, 991).
Nor was this concern limited to the West; the
president of Middlebury College in Vermont
asked, in 1849, “shall these adopted citizens
become a part of the body politic, and firm supporters of liberal institutions, or will they prove to
our republic what the Goths and Huns were to the
Roman Empire? The answer to this question
depends in a great degree upon the wisdom and
fidelity of our teachers and associated influences”
(qtd. in Cohen Vol. II, 995).
When Catholic immigrants (Germans first,
then other groups) began to organize their own
schools, this development was perceived by many
as an expression of a refusal to accept the requirements of life in American society. “They will be
shut up,” warned a prominent Protestant minister
in 1853, “in schools that do not teach them what,
as Americans, they most of all need to know . . . .”
If, instead, the children of immigrants could be
gathered into the common public school, “we
may be gradually melted into one homogeneous
people” (Bushnell 299-303).
Catholic schools, influential Americans
believed, were a menace to society, and their reli-

gious justification was in fact no justification at
all. In such schools, the children of immigrants
“will be instructed mainly into the foreign prejudices and superstitions of their fathers, and the
state, which proposes to be clear of all sectarian
affinities in religion, will pay the bills!” Bushnell
found it “a dark and rather mysterious providence, that we have thrown upon us, to be [sic]
our fellow-citizens, such multitudes of people,
depressed, for the most part, in character, instigated by prejudices so intense against our religion”
(Bushnell 299).
One of the most influential of the education
reformers, Ellwood Cubberley, proclaimed in
1909 that “each year the child is coming to belong
more to the state, and less and less to the parent.”
He and his allies were confident that “[s]ociety
would control its own evolution through schooling [;]. . . science would replace religion and custom as sources of authority” (qtd. in Tyack and
Hansot 106, 103, 107).
What accounts for the change from public
schools permeated with broadly Christian themes
and practices only forty years ago to the exclusion of Christmas trees and Santa Clauses from
many today? A quick answer might be that
American society has become more respectful of
cultural diversity, and that the exclusive presence
of Christianity would no longer be considered
acceptable. While true, this explanation is not
adequate. It is routine in other Western democracies to give equal, or at least proportional, time to
different religious traditions as they are represented in a particular school. Wouldn’t that be the
appropriate multicultural thing to do? But few
American public schools do so; their presentation
of cultural diversity rarely includes religious
themes in a serious way.
As with most social phenomena, there is no single explanation for the exclusion of living religions from American public schools. It would be
easy to assume that it is an inevitable consequence of modernity and of a growing societal
pluralism, leading to the secularization of public
life. Public schools would, by this account, simply be following wider social trends. However,
this explanation doesn’t work. In the first place,
the American people are not growing more indifferent to religion than they were in the past, nor
are they as secularized as the peoples of Western
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Europe, where religion continues to play a much
more prominent part in public education. In the
second place, the public schools are not following
a trend in public life but leading it. Religion
receives much more public recognition and support in Congress, in the military, in governmentfunded social and health services, in prisons, and
in higher education than it does in American public schools (Glenn 2000). The schools are an
island of secularity in a sea of varied but frequently dynamic religious expressions.
How do we explain the anomaly, then, that
schools, which we would expect to be more intimately concerned with communicating an
account of the nature of the Good than any other
sphere of public life, are, in fact, the most rigorously purged of any such themes?
Among the contributing factors to this development is a way of thinking about education and
religion that was originally held by a relatively
small elite who saw universal schooling as a
means of transforming society by “popular
enlightenment,” particularly in the face of what
was perceived as a deeply threatening immigration of Catholics from Ireland and Germany, and
then from Poland, Italy, and elsewhere. This
flood of aliens, mostly concentrated in a highlyvisible way in America’s cities, seemed to threaten to transform everything that old-stock
Americans held most dear. Fear of what Germans
call Überfremdun, an excess of foreigners, not
unlike what many French people are feeling
today, led to an emphasis upon the assimilating
role of the public school. This fear, in turn,
required that whatever might prevent immigrant
parents from enrolling their children must be
eliminated; I have told this story in some detail in
The Myth of the Common School.
The assumption that public schools should
avoid anything that could prove controversial can
be traced back to Horace Mann, who was concerned that schools not discuss the abolition of
slavery or what he called the “horrible doctrines”
of sin and redemption, and it has continued to be
widely accepted by teachers as a result of the
norms absorbed during their professional training. It is possible to trace the expanding influence of this ideology over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and to interpret
some of the recent developments in American
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education as reactions by the broader public
against this now-dominant set of assumptions
within the rather closed world of public education.
Perhaps the most available evidence is found
through study of changes that have occurred in
commonly used school textbooks. Oppewal, in
1972, studied “two junior high literature anthologies published by the same company twenty-five
years apart [and found] that the editors had, perhaps unconsciously, reduced significantly the
number of references to theistic thought and practice in the characters in stories, and in poems and
essays. . . [;] in the forties there were three times
as many lines devoted to theistic expression as in
the sixties.” Another study, by George Hillocks
of the University of Chicago, looked at the curriculum in Kanawha County, West Virginia, the
site of a widely reported confrontation between
religiously conservative parents and the public
schools in the early seventies, and found that
“only six of the thirty-eight prose selections mentioned Christians or Christian beliefs explicitly.
In addition, he noted that all six of the prose
selections were ‘pejorative’ of Christianity, either
directly in adverse comments about the shortcomings of Christianity or indirectly by showing
Christians as hypocrites or fools” (McCarthy et al
21f).
What is still the best study of this phenomenon
was published twenty years ago by Paul Vitz, a
New York University professor of psychology,
based upon research he had carried out for the
National Institute of Education. Vitz studied
commonly used elementary-school social studies
textbooks, high school U. S. history textbooks,
and basal readers, using a careful method of scoring the content of words and pictures. He concluded that, though to a varying extent, all of
these texts were biased. “The nature of the bias,”
he wrote, “is clear. Religion, traditional family
values, and conservative political and economic
positions have been reliably excluded from children’s textbooks.” For example, none of the sixty
social-studies texts that he studied “contain one
word referring to any religious activity in contemporary American life.” There was “an occasional rare picture (without captions) in these
sixty books [that] does depict Jewish, Amish, or
vague nondenominational religious scenes. The

few pictures, all told there were only eleven, that
do refer to religious activity were distributed over
sixty books and roughly 15,000 pages.” The censorship went to comical extremes: “One social
studies book has thirty pages on the Pilgrims,
including the first Thanksgiving. But there is not
one word (or image) that referred to religion as
even a part of the Pilgrims’ life.” Similarly,
almost the only oblique reference to religion that
he found was in a description of a Latino neighborhood: “Churches have places for dances and
sports events” (Vitz 3, 11).
In the eight high school U. S. history texts that
he analyzed, Vitz found a similarly unbalanced
treatment of religion: “There is not one book that
recognizes the continuity of the revival and evangelical movements throughout American history
since the Colonial Period. . . . Prejudice against
Catholics is commonly noted, but positive contributions in terms of the assimilation of countless
immigrants, the many hospitals and orphanages
built by Catholics, and the significance of the
Catholic school system are (with one exception)
not mentioned” (Vitz 57).
Vitz also examined twenty-two basal readers
for third and sixth grades, and he found that
“there is not one story or article in all these books,
in approximately nine to ten thousand pages, in
which the central motivation or major content
derives from Christianity or Judaism. . . . There
are scores of articles about animals, archaeology,
fossils, or about magic—but none on religion”
(Vitz 65).
Conclusions
It is evident that the quite different historical
experiences of this sample of countries go a long
way toward explaining how religion is treated in
the public schools of each.
That there could be a controversy in Germany
about crucifixes on the walls of public school
classrooms—unthinkable in the United States—
reflects the repeated decisions, in the nineteenth
century and again under Weimar and again after
World War II, to maintain the confessional character of public schools and to provide confessional religious instruction in those schools.
Originally based upon the conviction of policymakers that the religious instruction of the common people, in the interest of morality and social

stability, was the most important function of public schooling, the presence of religion in schools
was later also justified as a way to prevent development of alternative schools outside the public
system and thus to strengthen the role of public
schools as an instrument of nation-building. This
motivation was, in turn, supplemented, if not altogether replaced, in the 1920s and again in the
1950s by a concern for liberty of conscience and
the rights of parents.
In the Netherlands, by contrast, religious controversy has largely been avoided by allowing
different groups—including Muslims and
Hindus—to have their own publicly-funded
schools, while requiring that these schools comply with rather detailed government requirements.
The continuing role of religion in public
schools in England—though (as in Germany)
weakened by secularization and the demands of
an ever-expanding curriculum—came about in a
rather different way that continues to have its
effects. In England it was private (“voluntary”)
associations based upon Protestant denominations that took the initiatives to establish, staff,
and maintain thousands of schools, with financial
support but limited supervision by government.
These schools, and the Catholic schools that were
established at an increasing rate later in the nineteenth century, had an unapologetically religious
character. When, after 1870, municipal and country public authorities entered into competition
with the voluntary schools, the initiative still
remained profoundly local, and it has only been
within the last two decades that the national government has become deeply involved in setting
standards for schools. This tradition of local initiative has carried over into the provision of religious instruction and the required religious observances in schools. Negotiation of agreed syllabi
occurs among representatives of the various religious groups locally, and schools have considerable discretion to take into account the religious
identities of the families that they serve in deciding how religion will be discussed and practiced.
France and the United States are the two countries among our sample and among Western
nations that are most resolute about keeping religion out of public schools, though for quite different reasons. In the case of France, there was a
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long history of conflict between the enormous
social power of the Catholic Church, which was
resurgent throughout the nineteenth century, and
a political and cultural class that we can loosely
define as “free thinking” and that also increased
its power as the country urbanized. For reasons
that are historically and sociologically complex,
the latter remained in power throughout the Third
Republic, and Catholics did not (as in several
other countries at the time) form their own political party to advance their interests. The control
of the political process by the secular elite was
never altogether secure, however, and this control
made it seem all the more urgent to use public
schools as the primary instrument of creating loyalty to the secular republic. A striking aspect of
the significance attached to secularity in France is
that it came to mean far more than a simple neutrality among competing worldviews, much less
an exclusion of all such perspectives from the
public school and from public life in general.
Laïcité has taken on something of the function of
an alternative belief-system.
In the United States, by contrast, the legal
exclusion of religion from public schools has
evolved over the last half-century, as a result of a
series of decisions by the federal courts, decisions
that in most cases were strongly condemned by
public opinion and often by elected officials, who
saw their own efforts to accommodate religious
diversity in the schools overturned on the basis of
what seemed abstract legal principles. While an
ideological commitment to secularity, on the
French model, is by no means absent among
American elites, it is not as deeply rooted as it is
in France. The fact that the sessions of the
Supreme Court are opened with an invocation of
God, that the sessions of the Congress are opened
with prayer, that the President takes his oath of
office on a Bible, and that there are countless
other public manifestations of at least a residual
piety makes it all the more extraordinary that religion is scarcely, if ever, mentioned in most
American public schools, even in the study of history and other subjects where it could be expected to receive extensive consideration.
Although the legal rulings of recent decades are
the most obvious cause of this secularization of
American public schools, its causes, in fact,
reach back a hundred years earlier, in the
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response to the massive immigration of Catholics
from Ireland and Germany. It was in the hope of
persuading immigrants to send their children to
public schools where they could be made into
“real Americans” that school officials in northern
cities—usually without much discussion—gradually removed any elements of instruction or
school life that reflected the Protestant past of the
educational system. This course was just the
opposite of the course followed by German education officials in their successful efforts to keep
Catholic children in public schools and, unlike
Germany, America found that the effort was
largely a failure. Making public schools religiously void did indeed remove a Catholic objection, but it did not satisfy the desire of Catholic
parents for schooling that reflected their convictions. By 1950, there were three million pupils
attending private Catholic schools and many hundreds of thousands attending the schools established by Protestant immigrant groups.
The secular character of American public
schools has become so deeply rooted that nothing
seems likely to change it, which explains the continuing growth of private school alternatives as
well as the extraordinary phenomenon of “home
schooling.” To the extent that educational vouchers continue to gain both popular support and
legal legitimacy, it seems likely that religious
expression and even study about religion will
continue to be a characteristic of most private but
few public schools.
This brief historical survey—and it could be
usefully extended to other countries, such as
Austria, where conflict over public schooling
between Catholics and Socialists dominated the
political scene in the 1920s and made progress
difficult—suggests that conflict over religion in
public schools is less likely to be an issue when
alternative schools expressing a distinctive
worldview are made widely available, either
within the public system, as in England and
Ontario, or through public funding of private religious schools, as in the Netherlands, Belgium,
Australia, and other Western democracies. Such
a policy would greatly reduce such conflict in the
United States.
Even such funding of alternative schools is not
sufficient, as the example of France demonstrates, if the public school comes to be symboli-

cally and uniformly identified with a particular
worldview—in this case with a denial of the significance of religion, for believers, in all spheres
of life and identity. French and American policymakers might usefully reflect whether a free society should not so structure its educational system
that religious conviction—the dimension of culture that, for many citizens, matters most profoundly—can find an honored place.
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